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Global financial-economic crisis of 
2008-2009 has re-invigorated the discussions 
on the changes in the world order. As 
compared to the judgments of the previous 
twenty years, including prophesies of the �end 
of the history� and the �clash of civilizations� , 
the current debates – due to the crisis – have 
obtained a re-enforced economic-financial 
paradigm. Even most recent and most 
authoritative – but pre-crisis or initial-stage-of-
crisis – forecasts or visions of the future world 
order, like Richard Haas� �The Age of Non-
polarity� or the US NIC �Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World� report could not take into 
full account the realities and challenges in the 
aftermath of the global world-in-crisis. 
It is more or less clear, that imbalances 
produced a crisis. The latter brings new 
equilibrium based on the changes in the 
balance of powers in world politics and 
international relations. It so happened, for 
example, after 1929-1932 crisis and the 
subsequent �great depression� , or after the 
crises of 1969-1970. In the first case the World 
War II broke out, as a result of which the 
�bipolar� world appeared. In the second - crises 
favored political mobilization of the American 
society as well as economic renovation, in 
the aftermath of which the USA managed to 
become the one and only superpower.  
Would the current crisis become an 
exception? Or we may enter into another crisis 
era, the one of global order�s transformation. 
Will the world order established after the 
current crisis era become more secure? What 
will the new world order be like? How will the 
US leading role in the world change? What will 
happen to other large nations? 
We believe that it is possible to approach 
the answer to the above questions through 
examination of political consequences of pre-
crises eras of 1930s and 1970s.
The 1930s or 1970s?
Of course, all historic parallels are 
relative and non-critical attitude to them 
is misleading. Nevertheless, scholars have 
very few other means for analysis and design 
instruments for long-term political and 
economic scenario setting but to compare 
them to historical precedents. Such an 
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approach has proved its validity. It was used 
by Russian scholar Nikolai Kondratieff, who 
described the so-called �Kondratieff �s cycles� 
and predicted the world crisis of 1929-1932; 
by American political science classics Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. who correctly forecasted 
US domestic policy development, or be Frank 
Klingberg who predicted changes in US foreign 
policy in 1960s-1980s.
Of critical importance is, anyway, to take 
the situation for comparison correctly. The 
current financial and economic crisis were 
often compared to the crisis of 1929-1932, 
while current world situation to that of 1930s. 
To the proponents of this view the suddenness 
and global nature of 2008-2009 crisis and 
considerable destabilization of world financial 
system partially reminds the events at the 
turn of 1920-1930s. However besides certain 
similarity there are couples of principally 
important differences between the present 
state of affairs in the world and the situation in 
1920-1930s.
Firstly, the 1929 crisis began with panic 
at the New York stock exchange that spread 
over to stock exchanges of other countries. 
Contrary to the above, in 2008-2009 the crisis 
covered first of all the banking sphere, while 
the fall of stock exchange indexes was hardly 
as considerable as in late 1920s- early 1930s 
(in 1929-1932 DJI fell approximately by 90 
per cent - from 350 points to 41). Besides, 
from 1930 to 1933 only in the United States 
9 thousand banks were closed, while in 
2008-2009, due to mass government investment 
in bank system, banks in leading world states 
mainly endured; in 2008-2009 DJI fell less than 
by 50 per cent. So did main currencies – dollar, 
euro, yen, and pound sterling. Meanwhile, in 
1929-1932 pound, dollar and other currencies 
were considerably devalued, and world trade 
was practically paralyzed. Hence a conclusion 
suggests itself about the other than in 1929 
mechanism of emergence, different nature of 
the current crises and another set of contr-
ciclycal instruments implemented.
Secondly, it�s even more important that 
international political situation nowadays 
differs significantly from the one of 
1920-1930s: the world was deeply destabilized 
by World War I, and there was no a universally 
recognized leader. At that time Great Britain 
noticeably weakened after WWI was loosing 
its leader�s status, while the United States 
could not yet become a full-fledged leader in 
world politics and economy. As a result the 
situation cropped up when in 1930s Germany, 
Japan, and to some extent the USSR joined 
the struggle for world leadership besides 
Great Britain and the US. It promoted sharp 
increase of tension in the world, appearance 
of multiple international conflicts which finally 
led to World War II. Today the situation in 
the world is different: there is neither (or not 
yet) economic and political destabilization, or 
tensions in international relations as deep as 
they were in 1920-1930s. And nobody seriously 
contests US leadership.
We believe, that modern situation in 
the world in many aspects is closer not to 
the era of 1920-1930s but to the one of late 
1960s-1970s. The arguments for this thesis 
are as follows. The financial crisis that shook 
the USA and other countries in 1969-1970 was 
connected both with increased competition 
of the United States with USSR, Japan and 
German Federal Republic, and with certain 
overstrain of American economy in the course 
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of Vietnam war. The present 2008-2009 crisis 
is also in many ways connected, on the one 
hand, with US economic competition with 
China and other East Asian countries, and 
on the other – with US financial overexertion 
due to long term military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. However, just as in the 
1970s, US economic, political and military 
leadership is not seriously contested by 
anybody. Booming economic development 
in China and ongoing growth of its political 
influence are important factors, but something 
similar already happened in the 1970s: on 
the one hand, there was rapid export-based 
economic growth of Japan, and, on the other 
hand, growth of political and military power 
of the USSR. Nevertheless, the USA has 
preserved their world leadership. Moreover, 
temporary decrease of US political role in the 
world in 1970s was followed by revitalization 
of American power. It demanded from the 
USA consolidation of efforts and reforms in 
various public life spheres, but nowadays, it 
looks like that, the American society is also 
ready to carry out another cycle of important 
reforms. At least – there are strong intentions. 
Of course it is too early to make the final 
judgment about in what spheres of public life 
reforms could succeed and where they could 
fail. Domestic resistance to the reform in USA 
is very strong.
The 1969-1970 crises led to conspicuous 
changes in international financial system, in 
particular, to US� decision not to exchange 
dollars for gold, to abolish Bretton-Woods 
gold-dollar standard. At the same time no 
radical transformation of financial system took 
place: dollar just as before remained world 
reserve currency, while main financial centers 
kept their role. It is likely that at present, even 
in case of introduction of a new supranational 
world reserve currency, (issuing a new version 
of SDR, as advocated UN commission, headed 
by J. Stieglitz) the situation on world financial 
markets will not change radically either, 
unless, of course, some extraordinary events 
would take place.
Another similarity of key significance 
regards the situation in the Middle East and 
Islamic world. In September 1969 Islamic 
states leaders established the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), and in 1973-1974, 
due to OPEC actions, oil prices sky rocketing. 
Nowadays, in 2009, these organizations once 
again considerably stirred up their activities, 
and play still important role in the global 
economy and politics. Practical inability of 
present radically-minded Government in Israel 
to come to an agreement with radicals in Arabs 
and current regime in Iran might provoke 
other conflicts in the Middle East. Meanwhile 
the USA is militarily engaged not only in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan (in order 
to prevent Taliban from getting its nuclear 
weapons). All that cause anti-Western moods 
in the Islamic world.  Similar has happened 
in early 1970s following Arab-Israel wars in 
1967 and 1973. There were terrorist acts and 
hostage-taking in 1972 at the Olympic Games 
in Munich and other places.
But this time the situation is more 
serious than in 1970s. Today terrorism has 
acquired global scale, while �Arc of Instability� 
stretched from North Africa and Palestine to 
North Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Special alarm causes the �Asian wing� of the 
�arc� – the terrorist activities in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, as well as eventual conflicts in 
Central Asia. Severe social-economic crisis 
in some of the states may result in massive 
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joining by the young unemployed people of 
international terrorist organizations. All the 
above circumstances make closer cooperation 
among the US, European Union, Russia and 
China necessary to repulse terrorists and 
provide stabilization. 
However, paradoxical as it might be, 
in spite of all the shifts and changes, such 
as globalization and interdependence, that 
have occurred, arrangement of main political 
forces in the world in 2000s in a way reminds 
that of 1970s. The key political roles to a 
large degree remain the same, though some 
factors and actors playing these roles have 
given way to others. Thus, international 
revolutionary communism was as a matter of 
fact replaced by Islamic fundamentalism which 
is very active in many countries of the world, 
while the role of the second, weaker though, 
superpower instead of the USSR is now played 
by China. Ambitions of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and France�s is now expressed 
by the European Union, while South Korea, 
India and Brazil claim the part of Japan which 
was rapidly developing in 1970s. It indicates 
certain conservativeness (or continuity) 
in development of the very structure of 
international relations and world politics.
Given below are the main 8 resembling 
features between the 1970s period and modern 
70s 00-00
 US war in Vietnam (-7)
US military operations in Afghanistan (since 00) 
and in Iraq (since 00)
 Financial crisis in the USA (-70)  
Financial crisis in the USA, global economic crisis 
(00-00)

Changes in world financial system (abolition of 
Bretton Woods gold standard, devaluation of dollar in 
7 and 7)
Consideration of changes in world financial system 
in 2008-2009 (discussion on new world reserve 
currency, possible dollar devaluation)

Changes in world  political system (US rejection of 
active foreign policy in 70s, USSR and China� s foreign 
policy activity growth)
Shifts in international politics (transformation of 
US foreign policy course under President B.Obama, 
expressed, for instance in his �A New Beginning� 
speech on June , 00 in Cairo, and increase in foreign 
policy activities of Islamic states, China and Russia after 
007)

Domestic policy changes in the USA (growth of anti-
war movement at the end of 0s – beginning of 70s, 
social and economic reforms of 70s)
Domestic policy changes in the USA (change of 
moods in American society, Obama�s victory in 00, 
beginning of health, social and economic reforms)

World order’s non-equilibrium (OPEC �s oil embargo 
in 7-7, revolution in Iran in 7-7, conflicts 
between Israel and Arab states in the Middle East in 
70s.)
World order’s non-equilibrium (challenge from North 
Korea in 00, problems around Iran�s nuclear program 
and internal conflicts in Iran in 007-00, problems in 
relations between Israel and Palestinians)
7
Negotiations on armaments reduction (R.Nixon�s 
visit to Moscow in 7, conclusion of agreement on 
ABM (7), SALT-I (7) and SALT- (7)
Negotiations on armaments reduction (B.Obama�s 
visit to Moscow in 00, preparation of agreement on 
strategic nuclear arms limitation)

Aggravation of problems in world energy sphere 
(growth of oil prices. �energy crisis� of 7-7, 
transition to new energy-saving technologies in the US 
and Western Europe in 70s)
Aggravation of problems in world energy sphere 
(growth and fall of oil prices in 00-00, conflicts 
around oil and gas transit in 007-00, discussion 
about creation of �gas OPEC� , intensive introduction 
of ecologically clean energy sources in the US and 
Europe)
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one.
Amazing resemblance of the above listed 
processes and problems that aggravated in 
1970s and today accordingly, from our point of 
view, specifies not the repetition of situations 
in world politics and economy, but rather 
a new round in the spiral of international 
development, when impetuous growth gives 
place to a new crisis. Compared to 1970s 
the world has radically changed, but many 
problems unsettled at that time have recurred 
in a different state and on a wider scale.
Conflicts and Shocks are Ahead
If the comparison of the current situation 
in the world with the one in 1970s is at least 
partially fair, hence the whole number of 
important conclusions follow from it. 
Firstly, certain weakening of the world 
leader – the United States – is most probably 
temporary, as, just as in the 70s. But nowadays 
there are no real aspirant to the leadership. 
The USA is facing unprecedented challenges, 
but while there are no serious claimants to 
world leadership, America�s domination will 
continue. It does not mean, anyway, that the 
given state of affairs will be everlasting, and 
that future US leadership is fail-safe: once 
a real new candidate for world leadership 
may come out, or the leadership itself will 
be scattered among many poles of power (so 
called multipolarity).
Secondly, if the analogy we are dwelling 
on is justified, in the next few years the world 
might most probably face plenty of economic 
shocks and political conflicts. Weakening of 
US after defeat in Vietnam was misleading for 
some leaders in Arab states as well as for their 
Soviet counterparts. Thus, several years after 
1969-1971 financial crises the �energy� crises of 
1974-1975 broke out. The latter was caused by 
a sharp growth of world oil prices initiated by 
Arab countries and other oil-producing states 
after the war in the Middle East in 1973. 
New economic crises that may burst out 
after a short period of growth somewhere in 
2012-2013 might turn into an �analogy� of the 
above mentioned crisis. High probability of 
new shocks and crises is caused by general 
instability of world financial and political 
systems. Immediate reason for the new crises 
may be either another sequence of conflicts 
in the Middle East, or serious conflicts on 
post-Soviet space. Eventually, in Central Asia 
(where Kazakhstan, with regional leadership 
ambitions challenged by Uzbekistan and 
possesses considerable oil resources, while 
Turkmenistan – enormous natural gas 
resources), the region where Russia, the USA, 
the European Union and China compete for 
political-military and economic influence. No 
less concern causes the �dormant� conflicts 
in Trans-Caucasian region with rich in oil 
Azerbaijan and with Georgia, with its important 
energy-transit territory. Even more dangerous 
might turn out to be political conflict in 
Ukraine that will inevitably aggravate Russia-
West relations.
However the eventual new crises and 
even a relative political retreat of the USA will 
not mean defeat of the West. In 1975 American 
forces had to leave South Vietnam, which 
temporarily undermined US foreign policy 
positions and gave the USSR a chance to build 
up its influence in the �third world� . However, 
concurrently, while the USSR supported 
revolutions in Asia, Africa and Central America 
and financed �socialist camp� , the US learned 
their lessons from the Vietnam War and used 
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a chance to reform their army, having made it 
really strong, mobile and professional. Besides, 
in 1970s the US carried out other important 
reforms which made it possible to drastically 
strengthen their international economic and 
political influence in 1980s – 1990s. Withdrawal 
of American troops from Iraq planned to be 
accomplished in several years may repeat the 
US withdrawal from Vietnam. Still, just as in 
1970s it may not weaken the USA, but will 
allow them to concentrate on key economic, 
domestic and foreign political problems.
The end of 1970s was also in many ways 
dramatic. In 1978-1979 there was revolution 
in Iran that seriously shook US positions in 
the Middle East and Persian Gulf (nowadays 
the Big Middle East region). That revolution 
led to establishment of anti-American regime 
in Iran headed by charismatic religious leader 
Khomeini. At the same time that regime was 
not pro-Soviet, and weakening of the US 
standings in Persian Gulf did not automatically 
mean strengthening of those for the USSR. 
In its turn, the Soviet Union in the very end 
of 1979 brought its troops into Afghanistan, 
and a long Afghan War began. As a result, 
Afghanistan turned into a sort of another 
“world war” of bipolar era: there the Soviet 
troops confronted with unified heterogeneous 
forces, such as Islamic, including pro-Iran, 
fundamentalists, the USA, West European 
countries, and even China, that delivered 
weapons to Afghan mujaheads. Hence, in 
spite of the fact that by late 1970s US foreign 
policy positions had considerably weakened, 
while the USSR had reached the maximum 
influence in the world, in reality the Soviet 
Union entered the period of deep economic 
crisis and besides got stuck in Afghanistan. 
In other words, the defeat in Vietnam served 
to consolidate the United States for revival 
and reforms, while the defeat in Afghanistan 
appeared to be a final call for the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. There were only eight month 
between Soviet withdrawal from Kabul and the 
fall of Berlin wall.
The global-scale political-military 
consequences of these two wars were to a very 
high extent simultaneously preconditioned 
by the developments in the economic sphere. 
Though economic crisis of 1980-1982 once 
again seriously affected the USA and other 
Western countries, in contrast to 1969-1970 
and 1974-1975 crises, this time the US position 
in the world improved, while that of the USSR, 
on the contrary, worsened. In the course 
of 1970s the Soviet Union spent substantial 
resources on aid to its satellites, on support 
of revolutions and national movements. In 
1970s USSR economy was going through 
stagnation, later, under Mikhail Gorbachev, 
called �zastoi� . In the meantime the USA 
accumulated intellectual, technological, 
financial and political resources for another 
breakthrough. It started in 1983-1984 together 
with economic rise that gave an impetus for 
a new technological revolution, appearance 
of modern information technologies, personal 
computers, later Internet, etc.
We suppose that analogy to the events 
of late 1970s – early 1980 proves forecast 
of political and economic shocks in years 
2012-2020. These shocks may eventually 
be connected with development of new 
technologies (including revolutionary 
ones: biotechnologies, nanotechnologies, 
ecologically clean energy sources, faster 
means of information transfer, etc.), with 
changing geopolitical situation in the world, 
with unevenness of demographic processes 
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in different world regions, and with ensuing 
mass migration, with climate changes, 
with ecological problems, including fresh 
water shortage, with spreading of new 
epidemics, etc. As a result in various regions 
social and political conflicts will inevitably 
exacerbate. But at the same time to settle 
multiple problems the situation will demand 
coordinated measures of majority of states. 
Under the circumstances will increase the 
demand for effective global governance in 
order to consolidate the countries with diverse 
traditions, religions, culture. In the nearest 
future only the USA can be such a leader. It 
is of key importance, that the leader-state 
is ready for such a hard and responsible 
work and not being guided exceptionally by 
momentary, short-term interests.
New Trends
The most important trend among the 
ones that differ the beginning of the XXI 
century from 1970s is globalization. It�s just 
globalization that caused such diverse, and 
by all appearances unconnected processes 
as creation of global information market, 
instant flow of financial assets, booming 
economic growth of China and other Asian 
states, fast dissemination of new technologies, 
institutions, democratic and semi-democratic 
regimes, intensive communication of millions 
of citizens from different countries, global 
migration, global international terrorism 
etc. The global markets of financial, legal, 
educational, and health services appear. As 
well as global market for highly qualified 
professionals. �Economics of impressions� 
such as global sport, cultural or fashion events 
have a momentous. The current crisis is also 
in many aspects linked to all mentioned above 
globalization processes. 
Globalization has its �pluses� and 
�minuses� , its advantages and drawbacks. 
It�s necessary to learn how to manage 
globalization, but this task is beyond a single 
country�s power, even as potent as the USA. 
That�s why the leading states will have to 
learn how to coordinate efficiently within the 
framework of G-20 and other international 
organizations. Of course to find compromises 
and consensus among G20 would be a more 
challenging task then among G8.
Among other  new trends (and 
simultaneously political risks) it�s necessary 
to single out the threat of nuclear arms 
proliferation, as well as problems of climate 
change and spread of new dangerous 
epidemics. The danger of the fact that nuclear 
weapons will appear in Iran or in North Korea 
is high, but a real nightmare is a perspective if 
Taliban captures Pakistan�s nuclear arms and 
would be able to blackmail the whole world. 
There was no threat of the kind in 1970s, 
and the international community will have 
to confront it. Openly proclaimed slogans of 
�worldwide caliphate� are dangerous for all 
the leading world actors, including the USA, 
European Union, Russia, India, and China. 
As for climate change problems, those of 
fresh water shortage, etc., they also have a 
distinct political dimension: for example, many 
scholars predict that future conflicts and wars 
will be connected not so much with oil, but 
rather with struggle for fresh water sources. 
Eventually destabilizing are global epidemics 
like AIDS, atypical pneumonia or �pig� flu, 
fraught with serious economic and political 
consequences.
Besides, the impact of the coming 
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tectonic technological shifts may be 
ambivalent. For instance, relatively cheap 
(about US$ 1.5 thousand worth) procedure 
of decoding human genome of every person 
only in 4-5 years will cause lots of ethical 
and other problems. Any insurance company 
or bank may demand from their client to 
decode his genome, which means intrusion 
into inner psychological and physical world of 
a person making him vulnerable for outside 
interference. Cloning of a human, crimes 
accomplished with the help of Internet, trade 
in internal organs, etc. may become side 
results of stormy, uncontrolled development of 
new technologies.
Thus, compared to 1970s the world has 
become much more dynamic, much more 
globalized and to a larger extent vulnerable 
and unsafe. New tendencies seriously affect 
the political processes, international relations. 
But they do not call off certain similarity of 
historical situations. 1970s are already in a 
rather distant, two generations long past. 
A lot has changed since then. However the 
very logic and succession of events-in-crisis, 
transition years are changing considerably 
slower. 
Main Conclusions
Thus, if we take into consideration the 
parallels with 1970s period examined above 
with certain share of probability it is possible 
to discern some prospects. Firstly, the nearest 
decade, just as 1970s, will most probably 
hardly be calm; we are likely to witness the 
whole chain of crises and shocks. Geopolitical 
turbulence and shifts cannot be excluded 
in the Middle East and in post-Soviet space 
(Ukraine, Moldova and some Central Asian 
states) where interests of Russia, USA, EU 
and China intersect. In the meantime crises 
will most likely alternate with growth, and 
onward nature of world development, contrary 
to pessimistic estimations, will hardly get 
broken. At the same time on the background 
of turbulence in world politics and economy 
deep structural reconstruction will begin. 
Reforms will take place both on national and 
supranational levels. 
Secondly, the United Stated US will most 
likely preserve world leadership in the nearest 
decades, bur simultaneously the role of China, 
other BRIC countries, and the European Union 
will conspicuously increase. Thus unilateralism 
will gradually give way to multilateralism. 
Under the new circumstances the US will 
have to closely cooperate with main centers 
of political power (first of all with EU, China, 
Russia, and India) and seek acceptable 
compromises. The United States together with 
other countries will have to spare no effort 
in order to prevent the world from chaos and 
to preserve manageability of international 
processes. There are no serious aspirants to 
world leadership now, but eventual weakening 
of the United States might easily enough 
promote their emergence. At the same time 
attempts at any cost to demonstrate their 
strength regardless of consequences may 
rather weaken than strengthen the USA. 
Unwise demonstration of �hard power� will 
inevitably cause another sharp increase of 
anti-American sentiments in the world.
Thirdly, just like in 1970s we should most 
probably expect serious shifts in international 
politics, in world financial system, reformation 
of international political, financial and 
economic institutions. Of vital importance 
remain long expected and ripe reforms in IMF, 
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G-8, and G-20 and, of course, the UN. Also 
NATO is seeking a new strategy. President 
Medvedev�s initiative on engineering of new 
post-cold war European security institutions 
design demands creative efforts. These 
modernization efforts cannot be postponed 
any longer. Thus the task of the world leaders, 
in this case the United States and Russia, is to 
push realization of these reforms. Meanwhile, 
constitutional approval or change of the 
leadership in those two countries is to be 
happened in 2012. Plus Chinese leadership 
change also scheduled for 2012. That means 
rather tough schedule for coming three years 
and by all means could not be a synonym of 
global stability. 
Fourthly, the uniqueness of the current 
momentum is that no one major global 
international issue could be resolved without 
cooperation with Russia: either providing for 
stable development of post-Soviet countries; or 
Israeli-Palestinian, Armenian-Azeri, or South 
Caucasian conflicts; or �AfPak� aggravating 
problems; or nuclear non-proliferation, N. 
Korea and Iranian nuclear problems. Not 
talking about ABMD, global terrorism, new 
financial architecture, energy and water supply 
security, climate change, new technology 
governing, pandemic challenge etc. 
Finally, the feeling of mutuality of the 
eventual financial-economic disaster together 
with a �new beginning� in the US policy 
preconditioned an unprecedented momentum 
of vested good-willingness in world politics. 
Used properly and timely this momentum may 
prevail over vested interest groups of either 
national or transnational origin. If not – the 
scenario of the real �the end of history� would 
have a good chance. 
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